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MODERN-DAY PIRATES:  
WHY DOMESTIC PARENT CORPORATIONS 
SHOULD BE LIABLE UNDER THE ALIEN 
TORT STATUTE FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS WITHIN GLOBAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
ERIN DOWNEY* 
Due to a growing international focus on corporate social responsibility, 
transnational corporations increasingly have greater societal and legal duties to 
disclose and take responsibility for workers’ rights within their supply chains.  
For example, countries have introduced reporting requirements for corporations 
of certain sizes, and wronged supply chain workers have successfully brought suit 
against transnational parent corporations.  In 2018, a United Nations working 
group introduced a draft treaty that would hold transnational corporations liable 
for human rights violations arising in the context of business operations.  
This Comment argues that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is an appropriate 
mechanism to provide U.S. courts with jurisdiction over claims that foreign 
workers bring against U.S. parent corporations for workers’ rights violations 
within supply chains.  The ATS provides district courts with jurisdiction over 
claims brought by foreign plaintiffs for torts committed in violation of the law of 
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nations.  Given the growing international trend of holding corporations 
responsible for workers’ rights, U.S. courts should recognize a broader array of 
actionable torts under the ATS and U.S. parent corporations should reasonably 
foresee the risk of workers’ rights violations within their supply chains.  
Accordingly, the ATS should remain an available option for foreign workers to 
hold U.S. parent corporations responsible for such violations.   
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In April 2018 the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, 
PLC1 categorically foreclosed the possibility of foreign plaintiffs 
bringing suits against foreign corporations in U.S. courts under the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2  Joining a line of Supreme Court precedent 
restricting the applicability of the ATS, the Jesner decision further 
limited the jurisdictional grant of the ATS to provide recourse for 
wronged plaintiffs.3  Writing in dissent, Justice Sotomayor described 
the Court’s holding as “absolv[ing] corporations from responsibility 
under the ATS for conscience-shocking behavior.”4  Referring to the 
appropriate ATS defendants through the lens of international norms 
existing at the establishment of the ATS,5  the dissent identified the 
lingering question as, “Who are today’s pirates?”6  Who, as Justice 
Breyer wrote years before, are the “common enemies of all mankind”?7 
Corporations are modern-day pirates, potential common enemies of 
mankind.  Beasts of business, corporations possess the power to do 
both good and bad,8 and they are increasingly independent of 
government control.9  As corporations outsource production needs, 
                                               
 1. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 2. Id. at 1407–08. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 5. See infra Part II (identifying the 1789 ATS-appropriate norms as piracy, safe 
conducts, and ambassador rights). 
 6. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 129 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 7. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 131 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 8. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the power 
corporations have to cause suffering by considering the destructive impact of the 
Rwandan Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines, which broadcast inflammatory 
rhetoric that incited hatred during the Rwandan Genocide). 
 9. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:  A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 
111 YALE L.J. 443, 463 (2001) (explaining that corporations have power over individuals 
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their supply chains become more vast and complex; thus, corporations 
continue to expand their global reach and presence.10  Internationally, 
States and corporations have recognized the indelible role they now 
play in safeguarding basic human rights within these global supply 
chains.11  Accordingly, the ATS should remain an available “statute that 
helps to protect basic human rights.”12 
Despite recent jurisprudence further limiting the scope of the ATS, 
this Comment will argue that the ATS is an appropriate mechanism to 
provide wronged foreign supply chain workers with their day in court.  
Part I will address the histories of supply chains and corporate civil 
liability.  Part II will discuss the legal framework of the ATS, the seminal 
cases that transformed the jurisdictional grant of the ATS, and recent 
cases whose legal arguments have relied upon ATS jurisdiction.  Part 
III will first argue that the practice of corporate responsibility for 
workers’ rights violations is crystallizing into a norm of customary 
international law.  Part III will then analyze why the ATS is well-suited 
for global supply chain workers to bring claims against domestic parent 
corporations and further suggest that the criteria for actionable ATS 
torts should grow to encompass a broader array of torts that supply chain 
workers incur in unsafe working conditions, given the international 
trend of holding corporations responsible for workers’ rights.  This 
Comment will assert that the ATS should remain a mechanism through 
which U.S. courts have jurisdiction over cases from foreign plaintiffs 
holding domestic parent corporations liable for violations of workers’ 
rights within supply chains, to incentivize greater transparency and 
promote the global enforcement of fair working conditions. 
I.    BACKGROUND 
Corporations and human rights are intrinsically linked in modern 
society.  Historically, corporate acts that directly impacted human rights 
could evade governmental regulation or oversight.  Today, however, the 
balance is starting to favor the worker as States and international bodies 
                                               
and can transfer their activities to States that have fewer regulatory burdens); see also Kiobel, 
569 U.S. at 121 (majority opinion) (“Pirates were fair game wherever found, by any nation, 
because they generally did not operate within any jurisdiction.”). 
 10. Infra Part I. 
 11. Infra Part I. 
 12. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD:  AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES 134 (2015). 
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continue to implement guidelines and legislations intended to improve 
global working conditions. 
A.   The Intersection of Supply Chains and Human Rights 
Over 450 million people work in global supply-chain related jobs.13  
In an increasingly inter-related global economy, supply chains have 
become more complex. The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
characterizes global supply chains as “the cross-border organization of 
the activities required to produce goods or services and bring them to 
customers through inputs and various phases of development, 
production and delivery.”14  Supply chains emerge through the practice 
of outsourcing, whereby a parent company buys goods or services from 
outside suppliers rather than producing the goods or services within the 
parent company itself.15  Parent companies outsource the production of 
a good or service to a subcontractor.16 
The impact of supply chains on foreign workers is double-edged.  Supply 
chain jobs often provide opportunities for foreign workers,17 but the 
culture and business practices of subcontractors can have drastic effects on 
the workers.18  For example, in 2010, the stressful work environment at 
Foxconn, a Chinese subcontracting factory for Apple iPhones, led assembly 
                                               
 13. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS:  A CALL FOR A BINDING 
GLOBAL STANDARD ON DUE DILIGENCE 2 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
files/report_pdf/human_rights_in_supply_chains_brochure_lowres_final.pdf.  
 14. INT’L LABOUR CONF., 105TH SESS., REPORT IV:  DECENT WORK IN GLOBAL SUPPLY 
CHAINS 1 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf 
/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_468097.pdf. 
 15. See Outsourcing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OFFSHORING AND EMPLOYMENT:  TRENDS AND IMPACTS 15 
(2007) (“Outsourcing can occur within the country where the enterprise is located 
(domestic outsourcing) or abroad (outsourcing abroad).”). 
 16. INT’L LABOUR ORG., 86TH SESS., REPORT V (2B):  CONTRACT LABOUR (1998), 
https://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/rep-v2b.htm 
(defining subcontractor as “a natural or legal person who undertakes by a contractual 
arrangement with a user enterprise to have work performed for that enterprise”). 
 17. See INT’L LABOUR CONF., PROVISIONAL RECORD, 105TH SESS., REPORTS OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON DECENT WORK IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS:  RESOLUTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
SUBMITTED FOR ADOPTION BY THE CONFERENCE 2 (2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/group 
s/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_489115.pdf  (recognizing 
that global supply chains contribute to economic growth, create jobs, and can have a positive 
impact). 
 18. See id. (emphasizing that global supply chain failures also contribute to 
vulnerabilities in labor rights, such as occupational health and underpayment of wages); 
see also INT’L LABOUR CONF., supra note 14, at 26 (“The increasing cross-border flows of 
workers have also resulted in a greater risk of forced labour and trafficking in persons.”). 
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line workers to commit suicide by jumping off the factory rooves.19  
Heightened societal interests in sustainability and decent working 
conditions have stimulated an interest in “conscious consumption.”20  
Consumers’ desires to not mistakenly endorse human rights abuses 
through the purchase of commodities have helped to reinvigorate a push 
for brands’ transparency about the workings of their supply chains.21 
1. Corporate accountability for supply chain transparency 
Internationally, organizations and countries have implemented 
action plans and legislation to promote safe working practices.  In 
1976, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) entered into force.22  State Parties, in their obligation 
under the UN Charter to promote universal respect for human rights, 
“recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable conditions of work.”23  Under the ICESCR, favorable 
working conditions include safe and healthy working conditions, fair 
wages, equal opportunity for promotion, and reasonable rest days.24 
Broadly, the ILO’s resolutions and conventions emphasize a 
continuing commitment to respect workers’ rights.25  In 1998, the ILO 
adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, wherein member states respect and promote the following:  the 
                                               
 19. Brian Merchant, Life and Death in Apple’s Forbidden City, GUARDIAN (June 18, 
2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/18/foxconn-
life-death-forbidden-city-longhua-suicide-apple-iphone-brian-merchant-one-device-
extract (reporting that in 2010 alone, eighteen workers attempted suicide, fourteen 
workers died, and Foxconn officials talked down another twenty). 
 20. Peter Needle, Conscious Consumers, the Transparent Supply Chain and Ethical 
Sourcing, BLOG, SEGURA (June 7, 2018), https://www.segura.co.uk/newsroom/ 
conscious-consumers-transparent-supply-chain-and-ethical-sourcing (describing the 
“compassionate” or “conscious” consumer as a new type of buyer who considers the societal 
impact of the goods she purchases and is interested in the processes that made the product). 
 21. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(explaining that a California resident sued Nike, alleging that Nike made false 
statements or omissions concerning the manufacturing conditions of its products). 
 22. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
 23. 993 U.N.T.S. at 6. 
 24. Id.  One hundred sixty-eight States are State Parties, four (including the United 
States) are signatories, and twenty-five have taken “No Action.” See Status of 
Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL:  OFF. HIGH COMM’R, 
http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 25. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, 
INT’L LABOUR ORG. (June 18, 1998), http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration 
/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm [hereinafter ILO Declaration]. 
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right to collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor, abolition of 
child labor, and elimination of discrimination in employment.26  One 
187 countries are members of the ILO, and the ILO has eight 
fundamental Conventions, two of which the United States has ratified:  
the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention and the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor Convention.27 
The launch of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (UNGPs) in 2011 spurred an international movement toward better 
business practices and business responsibility.28  The UNGPs recognize the 
important role business corporations play in respecting human rights and 
the need for effective remedies upon a breach of their obligations29: 
Business enterprises . . . should avoid infringing on the human 
rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts 
with which they are involved . . . [and] seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their 
operations, products or services by their business relationships, even 
if they have not contributed to those impacts.30 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) introduced its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises31 in 
                                               
 26. Id. ¶ 2. 
 27. See Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited June 1, 
2019); Conventions and Recommendations, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/ 
global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-re 
commendations/lang--en (last visited June 1, 2019) (listing the subject matter covered 
by the eight fundamental Conventions, including the freedom of association and 
protection of the right to organize, the right to organize and collective bargaining, 
forced labor, abolition of forced labor, minimum age, child labor, equal 
remuneration, and employment discrimination); see also Convention Concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, 58 (entered into force 
Sept. 15, 1946) (defining forced labor as “all work or service which is extracted from 
any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily”). 
 28. U.N. Human Rights Council, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (June 16, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Docu 
ments/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf; see also UN Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:  
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/11/04 1 (2011) [hereinafter Implementing UNGPs], http://www.ohchr.org 
/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
 29. Implementing UNGPs, supra note 28, at 1. 
 30. Id. at 13. 
 31. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 9 (2011), http://www. 
oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES]. 
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2011, which encourage business partners, including suppliers and 
subcontractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible 
with the Guidelines.32  Although the Guidelines are legally 
nonbinding, the OECD Investment Committee encourages adhering 
member countries, one of which is the United States, to implement 
these recommendations.33  In 2018, forty-eight countries adopted and 
agreed to support implementing the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines 
for Responsible Business Conduct, which is the first government-
backed standard for corporate due diligence across all economy 
sectors and pertains to the human risks within global supply chains.34 
The UN Global Compact continues to support the underlying 
principle of promoting fair working conditions.35  In 2015, countries 
adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, whose 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent a universal 
blueprint to build upon the Millennium Development Goals36 and 
“balance the three dimensions of sustainable development:  the 
economic, social and environmental” to create decent work for all.37  
Goal 8 of the SDGs, Decent Work and Economic Growth, has two 
targets that expressly focus on promoting fair working conditions.38 
Recently, the UN charged an open-ended intergovernmental 
working group with constructing a treaty addressing the intersection 
                                               
 32. Id. at 41 (highlighting corporate responsibility among business partners and 
their suppliers, contractors, subcontractors, licensees and other entities). 
 33. See Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/members 
andpartners (last visited June 1, 2019) (listing thirty-six Member countries, ranging 
from advanced to emerging countries); see also OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at 9. 
 34. Countries Commit to Step Up Efforts to Drive More Responsible Business Conduct 
Through New OECD Instrument, OECD (May 30, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/inv 
estment/mne/countries-commit-to-step-up-efforts-to-drive-more-responsible-business 
-conduct-through-new-oecd-instrument.htm [hereinafter New OECD Instrument] 
(including as members the OECD countries and various other countries). 
 35. Infra Section I.B.1. 
 36. The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were the predecessor to 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  The MDGs called for civil organizations 
and countries to develop action plans to combat the scourges of poverty, hunger, and 
disease by a 2015 target date.  See Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), U.N., 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 37. G.A. Res. 70/1, at 3 (Oct. 21, 2015). 
 38. Sustainable Development Goals, U.N., https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org 
/sdgs (last accessed Apr. 19, 2019) [hereinafter “SDGs”] (aiming to achieve productive 
employment and decent work for all women and men by 2030); see also G.A. Res. 70/1, 
supra note 37, at 29 (calling on businesses and States to foster a “well-functioning 
business sector,” act to eliminate modern slavery (Target 8.7), and protect safe and 
secure working environments for all workers (Target 8.8)). 
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of business enterprises and human rights.39  In 2018, the Permanent 
Mission of Ecuador introduced a zero draft of a legally binding 
instrument to regulate the transnational activities of corporations and 
other enterprises.40  Within the purview of legal liability, Article 10(6) 
of the Zero Draft expressly states that those with transnational business 
activities shall be liable for human rights violations that arise in the 
context of their business operations, including “to the extent risk ha[s] 
been foreseen or should have been foreseen of human rights violations 
within its chain of economic activity.”41  Such a treaty would serve the 
purpose of ensuring that victims of transnational business human 
rights violations have effective access to justice and remedies for harms 
that they incur while working.42 
Regionally, the 2014 European Union (EU) Directive on Non-
Financial Reporting encourages EU corporations to disclose the social 
and environmental impacts of their business activities within non-
financial statements.43  The Directive on Non-Financial Reporting 
advances the transparency goals of corporate social responsibility and 
expressly states that the non-financial statement should include 
relevant information about a corporation’s supply and subcontracting 
chains to identify and prevent adverse social impacts.44  The non-
financial reporting requirements should include, at the minimum, 
                                               
 39. Fourth Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. HUMAN 
RIGHTS COUNCIL:  OFF. HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ 
HRC/WGTransCorp/Session4/Pages/Session4.aspx (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 40. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Zero-Draft, Legally 
Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, art. 2, ¶ 1 (July 16, 2018) 
[hereinafter U.N. Zero-Draft to Regulate Transnational Corporations], https://www 
.ohchr.org/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/wgtranscorp/session3/draftlbi.pdf. 
 41. Id. art. 10, ¶ 6(c). 
 42. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 43. Non-Financial Reporting, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing 
/company-reporting/non-financial-reporting_en (last accessed Feb. 12, 2019); see also 
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU 5 (2017), 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_versio
n.pdf.  EU directives are legislative acts that put forth goals that all EU countries need 
to achieve, but the respective countries have the autonomy to implement laws to attain those 
goals.  See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last updated May 24, 2018). 
 44. Council Directive 2014/95/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 330) ¶ 6 (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095. 
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information on social and employee matters and respect for human 
rights.45  All EU Member States had incorporated these disclosure rules 
through national legislation by the end of 2017.46 
Keeping abreast of the broader international movement, individual 
States have also taken initiatives to implement national legislation that 
focuses on corporate due diligence for working conditions within 
supply chains.  In 2015, the United Kingdom acted to regulate corporate 
disclosure about potential human rights abuses and implemented the 
landmark UK Modern Slavery Act (“UK MSA”),47 and in 2017 France 
and Germany followed suit by passing the “Loi relative au devoir de 
vigilance des sociétés des mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre”48 
and the CSR Directive Implementation Act.49  In 2019, Australia introduced 
a similar reporting requirement through its own Modern Slavery Act.50 
Emerging modern slavery legislation continues to percolate on the 
international stage.  Most recently, Hong Kong, and Dutch governments 
echoed the United Kingdom’s call to attack human rights risks within 
                                               
 45. See Non-Financial Reporting, supra note 43. 
 46. Innovative Implementation of EU Directive on Non-Financial Reporting, GRI (Feb. 7, 
2018) [hereinafter Implementation of EU Directive], https://www.globalreporting.org/ 
information/news-and-press-center/Pages/EU-Directive-on-Non-Financial-Reporting.aspx.  
For example, Denmark built upon an already-existing regulation, the Danish Financial 
Statement Act that mandated corporate transparency about sustainability choices, while 
Greece imposed transparent reporting requirements on corporations of varying sizes.  Id. 
 47. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (UK) (requiring corporations that 
conduct business in the UK and have a global annual turnover of more than £36 
million to disclose annually their steps to address slavery in supply chains). 
 48. Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés des mères 
et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on the corporate duty 
of vigilance for parent and instructing companies] (requiring French companies employing 
more than five thousand workers domestically or ten thousand worldwide to implement 
effective vigilance plans that directly address business-related human rights risks while 
mapping supply chain risks for all companies they directly or indirectly control). 
 49. Gesetz zur Stärkung der nichtfinanziellen Berichterstattung der Unternehmen in 
ihren Lage – und Konzernlageberichten [CSR Directive Implementation Act], April 2017, 
BGBLI at 802 (GER); see also Robert von Steinau-Steinrück & Stephan Sura, Do Good—And 
be Obliged to Talk About It?  LAB. L. MAG. (June 26, 2017), https://www.laborlaw-
magazine.com/2017/06/26/do-good-and-be-obliged-to-talk-about-it (explaining that the 
German Act obligates certain corporations to disclose their corporate social responsibility 
efforts, and that the disclosures must contain information regarding workers’ issues and 
respect for human rights). 
 50. Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) (Austl), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details 
/C2018A00153 (mandating that companies produce annual statements detailing their 
supply chain operations, slavery risks, and efforts to combat those slavery risks). 
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supply chains.51  Pending enactment, the laws would respectively combat 
modern-day slavery through public statements, civil actions against 
involved parties, and plans to eradicate child labor from supply chains.52  
The trend continues to spread as other countries consider implementing 
anti-slavery, pro-due diligence legislation for national corporations that 
conduct business activities abroad.53 
2. Domestic efforts 
The U.S. government’s response to addressing supply chain human 
rights abuses has primarily manifested in the form of regulation and 
disclosure laws.  At the federal level, the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) places due diligence requirements on the supply chain activities 
of government contractors with particular emphasis on eradicating 
human trafficking.54  The government implemented FAR to combat 
human trafficking in federal contracting, after President Obama’s 
Executive Order 13627, “Strengthening Protections against Trafficking 
in Persons in Federal Contracts,”55 bolstered the government’s 
                                               
 51. Julia Steinhardt & Hannah Edmonds-Camara, Developments in Modern Slavery 
Regulation:  U.K., Hong Kong and Australia, COVINGTON:  GLOBAL POL’Y WATCH (July 12, 
2018), https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2018/07/developments-in-modern-slav 
ery-regulation-u-k-hong-kong-and-australia. 
 52. See id. (noting the Hong Kong bill would require companies to publish annual 
slavery statements and allow victims to bring civil actions against those who benefitted 
from involvement in a venture that they should have known involved slavery); Gerard 
Oonk, Child Labour Due Diligence Law for Companies Adopted by Dutch Parliament, INDIA 
COMM. NETH. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.indianet.nl/170208e.html (illustrating how 
the Dutch law requires corporations to examine whether their supply chains contain 
child labor and, if they do, implement action plans to eradicate such labor). 
 53. See, e.g., Switzerland Considers Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation, 
ASSENT BLOG (June 22, 2018), https://blog.assentcompliance.com/index.php/switz 
erland-considers-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-legislation (proposing legislation 
that would compel Swiss companies in high-risk sectors to undertake human rights due 
diligence in their foreign business activities and include parent company liability); 
Michael Torrance, Canada Must Develop a National Plan on Responsible Business and 
Human Rights, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
report-on-business/rob-commentary/canada-must-develop-a-national-plan-on-respon 
sible-business-and-human-rights/article36117097 (calling for the Canadian government to 
develop a national action plan on business responsibility to stay in-line with global standards). 
 54. See generally FAR 52.222-50 (2015) (prohibiting government contractors from 
engaging in human trafficking and using forced labor in the execution of their 
contracted work).   
 55. Exec. Order No. 13,627, 3 C.F.R. § 13627 (2013).  In 1999, President Clinton 
also relied on his Executive Order power to introduce Executive Order No. 13,126, 
“Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child 
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approach to not tolerating trafficking.56  FAR requires contractors to 
certify that they have implemented compliance plans to prevent the 
occurrence of prohibited acts, and the rule contains “flow-down 
provisions” through which contractors will be responsible for the acts 
and omissions of subcontractors and agents at every tier of the supply 
chain.57  Accordingly, contractors need to verify that they have 
conducted due diligence and none of their agents or subcontractors 
are involved in trafficking-related activities.58 
Perhaps more well-known, § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)59 is an 
example of regulating supply chains due to likely human rights 
violations associated with conflict minerals.60  Under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, all publicly traded U.S. corporations must annually disclose 
whether any of their products contain conflict minerals.61  Efforts to 
minimize connections to tainted goods later led to the Trade 
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA),62  which 
stipulates that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can enforce 
regulations that govern imports and exports.63 
                                               
Labor,” which was intended to ensure that federal agencies do not obtain goods made 
by forced or child labor.  3 C.F.R. § 13126 (2000). 
 56. Final FAR Rule Released, VERITÉ, https://www.verite.org/final-far-rule-released; see 
also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, tit. 
XVII, § 1702, 126 Stat. 1632, 2093 (requiring contractors to take specific preventative 
measures to eliminate human trafficking and forced labor in supply chains). 
 57. See Final FAR Rule Released, supra note 56 (imposing obligations on contractors 
with more than $500,000 worth of work abroad). 
 58. See id. (recognizing that if said agents or subcontractors are involved in 
trafficking practices, the contractors must take remedial or legal action). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
 60.  § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m note (2012)). 
 61. J. Anthony Hardenburgh, Why Supply Chains Cannot Turn a Blind Eye to Sourcing Despite 
Regulatory Shifts, SUPPLY CHAIN DIVE (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.supplychai ndive.com/news 
/conflict-minerals-sourcing-risk-supply-chain-Dodd-Frank/437593 (defining “conflict minerals” 
as minerals whose trade funds millions of dollars channeled to armed rebels and insurgents, 
primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
 62. Pub. L. No. 114-125, tit. I, 130 Stat. 122 (2016) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4454 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 63. § 101, 130 Stat. at 127; see also Claire Reade & Samuel Witten, Understanding the 
US Ban on Importing Forced Labor Goods, ARNOLD & PORTER (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/04/understand
ing-the-us-ban-forced-labor-goods (discussing that Border Patrol had undertaken four 
enforcement actions against imports with forced labor concerns). 
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By way of pending legislation, the Business Supply Chain Transparency 
on Trafficking and Slavery Act, a proposed bill introduced in both the 
House and Senate, would require corporations to annually disclose their 
efforts to identify and combat supply chain abuses.64  If enacted into law, 
the bill would require public companies with over $100 million in global 
gross receipts to publicly disclose—as part of their annual reports to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—their efforts to prevent 
human trafficking, slavery, and child labor within their supply chains.65 
Most recently, President Trump introduced his own Executive 
Order to address global corrupt practices.  Executive Order 13,818, 
“Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights 
Abuses or Corruption,”66 strengthens implementation of the Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Global Magnitsky Act)67 by 
seeking to “impose tangible and significant consequences on those who 
commit serious human rights abuses.”68  Congress passed the Global 
Magnitsky Act in 2016, authorizing the President to impose sanctions 
against human rights violators with the capacity to target conduct by 
former or current government officials anywhere in the world.69 
Supply chain awareness persists beyond the purview of federal and 
executive action. On a state level, California became the first, and 
remains the only, state that has directly implemented disclosure 
                                               
 64. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2018, 
H.R. 7089, 115th Cong. 
 65. See id. § 2 (expressing the sense of Congress that such legislation would prevent 
businesses from inadvertently endorsing products tainted by human rights violations 
within their supply chains, while providing consumers with information on products 
free of violations). 
 66. Exec. Order No. 13,818, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,839 (2018). 
 67. Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1261, 130 Stat. 2000, 2533 (2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2656). 
 68. 82 Fed. Reg. at 60,839.  See generally Rob Berschinski, Trump Administration 
Notches a Serious Human Rights Win.  No, Really., JUST SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/50846/trump-administration-notches-human-rights-win 
-no-really (remarking upon the surprise that the Trump administration designated 
human rights abusers under an executive order tied to the elective authority of the 
Global Magnitsky Act). 
 69. See Global Magnitsky Act § 1263, 130 Stat. at 2534; see also Press Statement from 
Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.state.gov/secretary/2017 
2018tillerson/remarks/2017/12/276723.htm (expressing that the sanctions 
demonstrate the United States will continue to pursue consequences for those who 
commit serious human rights violations); Berschinski, supra note 68 (detailing how the 
Global Magnitsky Act could hold officials accountable). 
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requirements as a tool to combat the continuation of workers’ abuses.70  
Under the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act,71 large 
retailers and manufacturers doing business in California with annual 
worldwide gross receipts exceeding $100 million must provide 
consumers with information about their efforts to end human 
trafficking and slavery within their supply chains.72  Privately, individual 
corporations have begun to pick up the torch to mitigate their supply 
chain abuses by voluntarily modifying their fundamental working 
principles or codes of conduct.73  The heightened efforts to eradicate 
forced labor from production have transitively implicated pushes for 
more, or fully, transparent supply chains.74 
The ABA Business Law Section created the Working Group to Draft 
Human Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts 
(“Working Group”) to spearhead such an effort.75  With an aim to 
achieve “protection that is legally effective and operationally likely,”76 
the Working Group proposed Model Contract Clauses (“MCCs”) that 
could help companies comply with an increasing amount of human 
rights-focused legislation and minimize corporate risk.77  The Working 
                                               
 70. Client Alert:  The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, LATHAM & WATKINS 
(Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/california-transparency-in-
supply-chains-act-2010. 
 71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2019). 
 72. See § 1714.43(a)(1) (“Retailers to disclose efforts to eradicate slavery and 
human trafficking from direct supply chain for tangible goods”). 
 73. See generally CONSUMER GOODS F., BUS. ACTIONS AGAINST FORCED LAB. (2017), 
https://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/The-Con 
sumer-Goods-Forum-Social-Sustainability-Business-Actions-Against-Forced-Labour-Bo 
oklet.pdf (identifying Danone, Kellogg’s, and MARS as corporations that transformed 
codes of conduct or implemented action plans to combat potential supply chain abuses). 
 74. Cf. The Hidden Cost of Jewelry:  Human Rights in Supply Chains and the Responsibility 
of Jewelry Companies, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/ 
report/2018/02/08/hidden-cost-jewelry/human-rights-supply-chains-and-responsibil 
ity-jewelry (describing how Cartier and Chopard have “full chain of custody” for 
portions of their gold supplies, whereas Tiffany and Co. can trace all of its newly mined 
gold back to a single source). 
 75. David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International 
Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk:  2018 Report and Model 
Contract Clauses from the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International 
Supply Contracts, ABA Business Law Section, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093, 1093 (2018). 
 76. Id. at 1094. 
 77. Id. at 1095. 
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Group designed the MCCs to protect workers by applying to corporate 
policies that address a broad range of human rights issues.78  
B.   History of Corporate Liability 
Judicial systems across the world continue to interpret the question of 
corporate “personhood” under the law.  International courts have 
increasingly exercised jurisdiction over corporations for civil actions, and 
domestic courts have begun to more readily recognize civil corporate liability. 
1. Internationally 
The international community now recognizes the capacity to hold 
corporations directly responsible for civil violations,79 and transnational 
corporations (“TNCs”)80 have direct duties under certain multilateral 
conventions.81  That TNCs have the power to enforce their rights, 
                                               
 78. Id. at 1094.  Additional commentary on international supply chains and the 
MCCs by members of the Working Group can be found in this symposium issue.  See 
generally Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights:  Looking to Version 2.0 of the ABA 
Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519 (2019); E. Christopher Johnson Jr. et.al, 
The Business Case for Lawyers to Advocate for Corporate Supply Chains Free of Labor Trafficking 
and Child Labor, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1555 (2019); Ramona L. Lampley, Mitigating Risk, 
Eradicating Slavery, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1707 (2019); Jonathan C. Lipson, Something Else:  
Specific Relief for Breach of Human Rights Terms in Supply Chain Agreements, 68 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1751 (2019); Jennifer S. Martin, Private Law Remedies, Human Rights, and Supply 
Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1781 (2019); Roza Pati, Global Regulation of Corporate 
Conduct:  Effective Pursuit of a Slave-Free Supply Chain, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1821 (2019); 
David V. Snyder, The New Social Contracts in International Supply Chains, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 
1869 (2019).  
 79. Ratner, supra note 9, at 450; see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 
53–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Legal systems throughout the world recognize that corporate 
legal responsibility is part and parcel of the privilege of corporate personhood.”), 
vacated by 527 F. App’x 7 (mem.) (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 80. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 909 (2003) (“[A]n economic entity operating in more than one 
country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries—
whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and 
whether taken individually or collectively.” (quoting Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003))). 
 81. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk:  The Emergence of Human 
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 946 
(2004) (showcasing the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage and the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment as examples of treaties that directly impose liability on 
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through mechanisms like arbitration or dispute resolution proceedings, 
indicates an international legal personality.82  David Scheffer, in his 
amicus brief in support of the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.83 
petitioners, emphasized the consensus at the negotiations for the Rome 
Statute that corporate civil—but not criminal—liability stood as a 
recognized, general principle of law.84 
International organizations have also introduced initiatives with the 
intent to influence business practices.  In 1999, the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan proposed a “Global Compact” of shared values, 
which encouraged businesses to voluntarily support and adopt nine key 
principles, addressing general human rights obligations, environmental 
protection, and labor standards.85  In 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved “Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,” which, although not a treaty 
and accordingly not binding, the UN intended to also apply to domestic 
enterprises when relevant.86 
Legal systems of individual States have permitted lawsuits that 
necessitate some finding of corporate liability or shared responsibility 
to the extent that courts may exercise jurisdiction.87  In 2015, a German 
court exercised jurisdiction over a compensation claim that survivors 
of a Pakistan factory fire brought against KiK, a German corporation 
that was the factory’s main customer.88  In the same year, an appeals 
court in The Hague ruled that Royal Dutch Shell could be liable for 
the actions of its Nigerian subsidiary, when Nigerian farmers filed suit 
                                               
corporations, as legal persons); see also Phillip C. Jessup, The Subjects of a Modern Law of 
Nations, 45 MICH. L. REV. 383, 387 (1947) (“Corporations or partnerships may also be 
subjects of international law.”). 
 82. See Ratner, supra note 9, at 459. 
 83. 569 U.S. 108 (2013); see also infra Section III.C.2. 
 84. Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University School of Law, 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 3–5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 2743194. 
 85. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 80, at 903 (recognizing that this initiative 
failed to “bind all business to follow minimum human rights standards”). 
 86. Id. at 901. 
 87. See infra Section III.C. 
 88. The 2012 fire at Ali Enterprise’s factory killed over 260 people, and KiK 
publicly acknowledged that the factory manufactured most of its products.  The 
survivors alleged that KiK shared responsibility for the factor’s lack of fire safety 
measures.  Time Line of the Ali Enterprises Case, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, 
https://cleanclothes.org/safety/ali-enterprises/time-line-for-the-ali-enterprises-case 
(last visited June 1, 2019). 
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for the destructive pollution from oil spills.89  Within the United 
Kingdom, a court upheld claims that Zambian citizens brought against 
Vedanta Resources for injuries stemming from pollution and damages 
of copper mine discharges.90  The court reasoned that since Vedanta 
was the holding company of the mine and thus had superior 
knowledge, Vedanta would be better suited to protect the subsidiary’s 
employees against the risks of injury.91 
2. Domestically 
Domestically, “[t]he idea that corporations are ‘persons’ with duties, 
liabilities, and rights has a long history in American domestic law.”92  
During apartheid in South Africa, U.S. corporations with affiliates in 
South Africa signed on to an agreement that called for the equal 
treatment of non-white employees. The Sullivan Principles, as this 
agreement came to be known, constituted a voluntary code of conduct 
designed to promote equal employment practices of U.S. corporations 
operating in South Africa. By signing on to the agreement, U.S. 
corporations affirmed their support for a high standard of labor 
practices that could contribute to ending apartheid.93 
Case law demonstrates that U.S. plaintiffs face difficulties in 
“piercing the corporate veil” and convincing a court to exercise 
                                               
 89. See Dutch Appeals Court Says Shell May be Held Liable for Oil Spills in Nigeria, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2015, 8:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/dec/18/dutch-appeals-court-shell-oil-spills-nigeria (upholding 
jurisdiction because the court could not prematurely ascertain whether Shell was not 
liable for possible negligence of its Nigerian subsidiary). 
 90. Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC, [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [1–7]. 
 91. Id. at [82].  To ascertain whether a parent company owed a duty of care, the 
court suggested a three-part test of foreseeability, proximity, and reasonableness.  Id. 
at [69]; see also id. at [75] (referencing Lubbe v. Cape PLC, Lubbe v. Cape PLC, [2000] 
UKHL 41, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545, wherein the court held that it was appropriate to find 
a parent corporation had a duty of care to advise the subsidiary on steps to take for 
asbestos, given the parent’s superior knowledge of the factory and management). 
 92. Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel:  Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations 
of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 
46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 225 n.278 (2014) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013)). 
 93. The (Sullivan) Statement of Principles (Fourth Amplification), Nov. 8, 1984, 
reprinted in Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in 
South Africa, 24 I.L.M. 1496 (1985) [hereinafter Sullivan Principles] (recognizing the 
importance of actively countering human rights violations and not just passively engaging). 
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jurisdiction.94  In Daimler AG v. Bauman,95 the Supreme Court limited 
situations in which federal and state courts can exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation by stating that jurisdiction is likely 
limited to the state or country where the corporation is incorporated 
or headquartered.96  Judicial hesitancy to exercise jurisdiction over 
corporations can also stem from reticence to interfere with foreign 
policy if the corporation is foreign.97 
Increasingly, scholars have considered tort modes of liability as 
feasible methods of holding corporations responsible for the acts of 
their associates.98  Scholars have proffered the possibility of direct 
liability99 or the agency principle.  The agency principle could impose 
liability based on contract concepts and find the parent corporation 
liable for the acts of a subsidiary “agent” that was under its control.100 
                                               
 94. See Skinner, supra note 92, at 212–13, 216–17 (noting that human rights 
practitioners have been unsuccessful in asserting claims on “piercing the corporate 
veil” but have sometimes succeeded on agency theory claims); see also MICHAEL 
KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:  ENFORCEMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH US TORTS LAW 285 (2009) (“[T]he doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable concept which constitutes a judicial 
exception to limited liability,” by which judges hold the parent company responsible). 
 95. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 96. See id. at 139 n.20. 
 97. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(noting the case does not implicate problems with bringing foreign nationals into U.S. 
courts because the defendants are citizens). 
 98. See generally Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort:  How Corporate 
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 207, 209 (2008) (exploring the relationship between corporate engagement and 
corporate liability under the ATS); Matthew E. Danforth, Note, Corporate Civil Liability 
Under the Alien Tort Statute:  Exploring Its Possibility and Jurisdictional Limitations, 44 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 659, 662 (2011) (arguing that human rights victims may be able to 
recover from corporations under the ATS).  
 99. See Jennifer M. Green, Corporate Tort:  International Human Rights and Superior 
Officers, 17 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 447, 450 (2017) (describing direct liability as the concept of 
“holding corporate officers liable for their role in human rights violations when they had 
a direct role” in the violations).  For an international example, England’s Companies Act 
of 2006 allowed for foreign direct liability:  a parent corporation owes a duty of care to a 
subsidiary’s employees or anyone impacted by the subsidiary’s actions if the parent 
corporation is directly involved with the subsidiary’s actions or exercises de facto control 
over the actions.  Id. at 459 (citing Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 1159 (U.K.)). 
 100. See KOEBELE, supra note 94, at 297 & n.86 (citing THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1.01) (explaining that agency law imposes liability based on 
contract law concepts and may make the parent corporation, as the principal, 
responsible for obligations of the subsidiary, as the agent acting under the control of 
the parent corporation). 
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II.    ATS LITIGATION 
A.   Historical and Legal Foundations 
Originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,101 the ATS, also known 
as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),102 provides that “the district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”103  The First Congress enacted the ATS to protect 
the United States from liability for violations of international norms by 
holding individuals, rather than the then-young nation, responsible 
for violations of such norms committed against other nations or their 
citizens.104  The ATS allowed Congress to comply with the United States’ 
obligation to rectify its citizens’ violations of the law of nations.105 
The term “law of nations” denotes “international law,” which 
imposes obligations that can govern the behavior of States and private 
actors.106  Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ Statute), the foremost enumeration of international law 
sources, lists four distinct sources from which international law could 
arise:  (1) international conventions; (2) “international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”; (3) general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial decisions and 
teachings of highly qualified publicists.107 
                                               
 101. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
 102. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 775 n.21 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (noting that the Alien Tort Statute and Alien Tort Claims Act can be used 
interchangeably). 
 103. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also BREYER, supra note 12, at 135 (defining a tort as “a civil 
wrong causing injury”). 
 104. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of 
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 449 (noting that in 1789 the United States was a young 
and weak country, and the First Congress wished to prevent conflict with other nations). 
 105. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 104, at 449. 
 106. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1420 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 49 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. 
Johnson 1863) (defining the law of nations as “the science which teaches the rights subsisting 
between nations or States, and the obligations correspondent to those rights”). 
 107. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060. 
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Binding international legal “norms”108 create, change, or terminate 
duties for States.109  Binding legal norms primarily derive from 
conventions, such as treaties that States have ratified, or customary 
international law, which consists of norms that are not codified but 
nevertheless are the product of “general and consistent practice of 
[S]tates followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”110  
Essentially, States observe customary rules because they consider those 
rules to be binding.111  When plaintiffs bring ATS suits, the plaintiffs 
allege that the defendant committed a tort that violated the law of 
nations—generally meaning that the committed tort violated a 
substantive prohibition on particular conduct, and under 
international law that prohibition was legally binding.112 
Absent a treaty, custom can give rise to legally binding norms 
through the existence of State practice and opinio juris.113  State practice 
need not be universal, but such practice must be general, consistent, 
and representative “at least of all major political and socio-economic 
systems.”114  Diplomatic acts and instructions, public measures and acts, 
and official statements of policy, whether unilateral or undertaken in 
cooperation with other States, can characterize a growing State 
                                               
 108. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (contextualizing “norm” 
as referring to substantive conduct within international law); see also Ann Florini, The 
Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 363, 364–65 (1996) (referring to a 
“norm” as a standard of behavior that States obey because they view it as legitimate). 
 109. See MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES:  A MANUAL ON 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 6 (2d ed. 1997) (articulating 
that some binding legal norms are peremptory, meaning that they are non-derogable; 
some legal norms are non-peremptory and those from which States can derogate, although 
not unilaterally; and soft law, in comparison, is comprised of rules that States follow merely 
out of utility or for persuasiveness, but the rules do not legally bind the States). 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 111. ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 50 (7th ed. 2012); see also 
VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 58 (stating that the binding force of treaties and customary 
law “must be identical”). 
 112. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (introducing the norms 
against genocide, slavery, and torture as examples of such substantive prohibitions that 
international law considers binding). 
 113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 cmt. c. 
 114. VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 29; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. b (presenting that State practice can 
be general even if not universally followed, but the practice should have a wide 
acceptance among States particularly involved in the relevant activity). 
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practice.115  Of equal importance, opinio juris is the State’s conviction 
that it follows a certain practice as a matter of law, rather than out of 
comity.116  For example, a State’s express statement that a particular 
rule is obligatory or customary can provide clear evidence of the State’s 
legal conviction, as can votes that States cast during the UN drafting 
process.117  A State that persistently objects, however, is not bound by 
an eventual customary rule if the State has consistently maintained its 
objections since the rule began to form.118 
To assert jurisdiction under the ATS, then, plaintiffs must prove that 
the alleged tort violated a norm of international law.119  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has narrowed the applicable scope of international law, 
but the text of the ATS only requires that international law universally 
condemns the alleged conduct.120 
B.   Cases that Defined the Modern Scope of the ATS 
Plaintiffs rarely invoked the ATS until the 1980s, when lower courts 
started to hear claims that relied on the ATS as an avenue for foreign 
citizens to sue other foreign citizens for violations of international law 
that occurred on foreign soil.121 
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,122 Paraguayan citizens sued a Paraguayan 
official whom they claimed tortured and killed their son.123  Employing 
an expansive approach to the ATS, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit found that the ATS permitted federal jurisdiction when 
                                               
 115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 cmt. b.  See generally VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 17–29 (including the following 
as examples of State practice:  opinions of national legal advisors, verbal statements, 
and national legislation). 
 116. See VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 48 (promoting the importance of opinio juris as 
a way of “asking whether a practice is law, or mere usage or comity, or even 
accidental”); CLAPHAM, supra note 111, at 57 (“Custom in its legal sense means 
something more than mere habit or usage . . . .”). 
 117. See VILLAGER, supra note 109, at 50–51. 
 118. See id. at 34. 
 119. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 
(9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]nternational law controls the threshold question of whether an 
international legal norm provides the basis for an ATS claim . . . .”). 
 120. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1421 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 121. See generally Bellia & Clark, supra note 104, at 458 (discussing the modern 
expansion of the ATS). 
 122. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 123. Id. at 878 (contending that appellee Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, an 
Inspector General of Police, tortured Joelito Filartiga to death). 
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a foreign citizen sued for a violation of the law of nations.124  In so doing, 
the Filartiga court introduced the threshold question for ATS claims:  
whether the alleged conduct violates the law of nations.125  The court 
found that torture fit within the law of nations, given that modern 
international law prohibited torture and the international community 
universally abhorred torture.126  The court looked to numerous 
international agreements to verify the universal condemnation of torture 
and ultimately deemed that the law of nations “may be ascertained by 
consulting the work of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by 
the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions 
recognizing and enforcing that law.”127  Granting that the “alien” 
appellants properly brought the ATS action in federal court for a tort 
committed in violation of the law of nations, the court reaffirmed the 
jurisdictional standard under the ATS:  “It is only where the nations of 
the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not 
merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that 
a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation 
within the meaning of the statute.”128  According to the Second Circuit, 
“the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”129 
More than two decades after the Second Circuit decided Filartiga, 
the Supreme Court first reviewed the jurisdictional scope of the ATS 
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.130  Respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 
a Mexican physician, brought a suit against petitioner Jose Francisco 
Sosa, alleging that Sosa violated the norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest 
and detention when Sosa and others abducted Alvarez-Machain and 
brought him from Mexico to Texas, where federal officers arrested 
                                               
 124. Id. at 887. 
 125. Id. at 880; see also infra notes 145–51 and accompanying text (examining the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.). 
 126. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (considering that the constitutions of over fifty-five 
nations expressly or implicitly prohibited torture, while the U.S. State Department 
reported a general recognition of the principle against torture). 
 127. Id. at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 
(1820)); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (exemplifying the 
principle that courts must interpret international law as it has evolved and exists 
today); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Customary international law results from a general 
and consistent practice of States followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”). 
 128. Id. at 888. 
 129. Id. at 890. 
 130. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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him.131  Considering whether the courts could recognize new, 
enforceable international norms in ATS lawsuits, the Supreme Court 
found that as a jurisdictional grant, the ATS action must “rest on a 
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the [eighteenth 
century] paradigms we have recognized.”132  Absent an established rule 
of international law, Alvarez-Machain attempted to demonstrate that 
the prohibition against arbitrary arrest amounted to binding 
customary international law.133  Although Alvarez-Machain cited two 
international agreements—the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)—to support his customary international law argument, 
neither instrument created enforceable obligations for the United 
States,134 and the Court reasoned that Alvarez-Machain cited little 
authority to support his claim of a binding customary norm.135  
Ultimately, the Court found that a single illegal detention for less than 
one day, accompanied by a lawful transfer to authorities, did not 
violate a norm of international law so well defined as to permit a 
federal remedy through the ATS.136 
Adhering to the Supreme Court’s decision that the ATS only 
provides jurisdiction over violations of specific international norms, 
the Second Circuit analyzed the creation of such a norm in Abdullahi 
                                               
 131. Id. at 697–99.  The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) asked for the Mexican 
government’s assistance in bringing Alvarez-Machain to the United States, where a 
federal grand jury had indicted him for the 1985 torture and murder of a DEA agent.  
Id. at 697–98.  When the negotiations with the Mexican government continued to stall, 
the DEA hired Mexican nationals (one of whom was Sosa) to abduct Alvarez-Machain 
from his house and bring him to the United States.  Id. at 698. 
 132. Id. at 725.  In the eighteenth century, at the time of the enactment of the ATS, 
the international community considered the three principal offenses against the law 
of nations to be:  (1) violations of safe conducts; (2) infringement of ambassador 
rights; and (3) piracy.  Id. at 724.  William Blackstone reasoned that violations of the 
law of nations, particularly the principal offenses, would result in war if they were 
attributable to whole States or nations.  See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *68 (Wayne Morrison ed. 2001). 
 133. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735. 
 134. See id. at 734–35. (differentiating that the Declaration does not impose its own 
obligations as a matter of international law and the Covenant, while binding, cannot 
create enforceable obligations because the United States ratified the Covenant with 
the understand that it would not be self-executing). 
 135. Id. at 736. 
 136. Id. at 738. 
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ex rel. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.137  In Abdullahi, Nigerian children and their 
guardians sued Defendant Pfizer, alleging that Pfizer violated a 
customary international law norm prohibiting involuntary medical 
experimentation on humans by using children to test experimental 
antibiotics without the children’s consent or knowledge.138  The 
Second Circuit reversed the district court and held that the prohibition 
against nonconsensual medical experimentation fulfilled the Sosa 
stipulations for a law of nations norm.139  The court referred to the ICJ 
Statute, which binds all UN members as parties, to identify authorities 
that provide proof of the sources of international law:  international 
conventions, custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations, and judicial decisions.140 
To analyze whether the prohibition amounted to a well-defined and 
universal norm, the court considered international and domestic 
actions.141  In the United States, patient-subject consent has been 
required in drug research since 1962, when Congress mandated it; the 
FDA passed regulations regarding informed consent; and the 
government generally attributed importance to this norm.142  
International actions further supported the norm:  in 2001, European 
Parliament and the Council of the EU passed a Directive requiring 
member States to adopt rules protecting those incapable of giving 
informed consent.143  Additionally, since 1997, thirty-four member 
States of the Council of Europe had signed the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, a binding convention and source of 
customary international law.144 
In 2013, the Supreme Court further narrowed the reach of the ATS 
when it decided Kiobel and invoked the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to restrict foreign access to U.S. courts.145  Nigerian 
nationals sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations under the 
ATS, alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian 
                                               
 137. 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 138. Id. at 168. 
 139. Id. at 183–84. 
 140. Id. at 175. 
 141. Id. at 181. 
 142. Id. at 182. 
 143. Id. at 183. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013). 
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government in violating the law of nations.146  The Court focused on 
the following questions:  (1) whether the law of nations recognizes 
corporate liability and (2) whether, and under what circumstances, the 
ATS allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the 
law of nations occurring within a territory of a foreign sovereign.147 
Significantly, the Court identified a link between the ATS and a 
presumption against extraterritoriality:  even when claims “touch and 
concern” the United States, the claims need to do so with “sufficient force 
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”148  In 
this case, all of the relevant conduct occurred outside of the United 
States, the petitioners were foreign, and the respondents were foreign 
companies.149  Concerned with the ramifications of judicial interference 
in foreign policy,150 the Court declined to find that the petitioners’ 
claims, and mere corporate presence in the United States, overcame the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.151 
C.   Modern ATS litigation and Corporate Defendants 
Post-Kiobel litigation heralded a circuit split over ATS jurisdiction and a 
continuing debate over whether the ATS applies broadly to both 
individuals and legal persons.152  After the Court foreclosed plaintiffs’ 
ability to bring suit against a foreign corporation because the corporation 
lacked sufficient ties to U.S. soil, the circuit courts diverged over how to 
                                               
 146. See id. at 111–13 (stating that the respondents provided Nigerian forces with food 
and compensation while the Nigerian forces attacked Ogoni villages and killed residents). 
 147. Id. at 114 (announcing that the Court heard oral argument again and would 
affirm the judgment below based on its answer to the second question). 
 148. Id. at 124–25. 
 149. Id. at 113. 
 150. Id. at 124 (discussing the possibility that other nations could hale U.S. citizens into their 
courts for allegedly violating the law of nations, if the Court were to accept jurisdiction). 
 151. Id. at 124–25.  In his concurrence, however, Justice Kennedy seemed to shy 
away from categorically preventing extraterritorial application and expressed that 
other cases may arise with serious allegations of international law violations that would 
warrant a proper deliberation over whether to grant jurisdiction under the ATS.  Id. 
at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 152. See Heather Cohen, The Drafters Knew Best:  Corporate Liability and the Alien Tort 
Statute, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 14, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/09/14/the-
drafters-knew-best-corporate-liability-and-the-alien-tort-statute (examining the 
language and historical context of the ATS to determine that the drafters intended to 
place no limitation on who could be sued, even emphasizing that in 1666 a man 
successfully sued the East India Company). 
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characterize the scope of the ATS.153  The contested question became 
whether corporations could be defendants under the ATS. 
A series of successive cases highlighted the discord over the scope of 
ATS jurisdiction.  In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,154 the 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s employees’ abusive treatment 
of Abu Ghraib prisoners violated the law of nations, including the 
prohibition against torture.155  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that the ATS provided a cause of action even though the 
acts occurred on foreign soil because:  (1) the alleged torture occurred 
at a U.S. government-operated military facility and was perpetrated by 
U.S. citizens who were employed by the defendant; (2) the defendant 
was a U.S. corporation; and (3) the U.S. Department of the Interior 
issued the defendant’s performance contract to conduct interrogations 
at Abu Ghraib.156  The court noted that further litigation, the result of 
granting jurisdiction under the ATS, would also not interfere with 
foreign policy because the political branches had already indicated that 
the United States would not tolerate acts of torture.157 
In Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc.,158 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit considered a class action filed by former Ivorian child slaves 
against Nestlé for allegedly aiding and abetting child slavery by 
sourcing cheap cocoa from Ivorian farms.159  After holding that the 
norm against slavery was universal and could be brought against the 
corporate defendants,160 the Ninth Circuit ultimately declined to 
decide whether the presumption against extraterritoriality barred the 
claim, and it remanded the complaint for plaintiffs to amend to allege 
that some of the underlying activity took place in the United States.161 
In Doe v. Drummond Co.,162 the Eleventh Circuit determined that U.S. 
corporate status was relevant to Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test 
                                               
 153. See Skinner, supra note 92, at 197–200 (noting that the Kiobel Court left open 
the possibility that claims touching and concerning the U.S. with sufficient force could 
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 154. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 155. Id. at 521–22, 525. 
 156. See id. at 529–31 (deeming that the ATS claims involved “substantial ties” to the 
United States). 
 157. Id. at 530. 
 158. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 159. Id. at 1017. 
 160. See id. at 1022 (finding support for corporate liability for slavery offenses in the statutes 
of international tribunals and liability for private and non-State actors at Nuremberg). 
 161. Id. at 1028–29. 
 162. 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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because the extraterritorial application could be assuaged or 
inapplicable, given that the court would not be haling foreign 
nationals into U.S. courts to defend themselves.163  In Drummond, the 
plaintiff brought the action on behalf of more than 100 Colombian 
citizens killed in an armed conflict with the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia, a Colombian paramilitary group, and filed against multiple 
defendants, including an Alabama-based coal mining company.164  The 
ATS claim put forth that the U.S. citizens aided and abetted or 
contributed to human rights violations outside the United States.165  
The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs may pursue claims against 
corporations, based on both direct and indirect theories of liability.166  
However, although the court found that the (1) U.S. citizenship and 
corporate status of the defendant, (2) U.S. interests implicated by the 
claims, and (3) alleged U.S. conduct were relevant in considering 
whether claims “touch and concern” the United States, the court 
concluded that the factors were not sufficient to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.167 
The most recent Supreme Court decision involving the ATS, Jesner, 
ultimately serves to further limit corporate liability under the statute.  
The petitioners, victims who were injured or killed in foreign terrorist 
attacks, sought to impose liability on Arab Bank—a Jordanian 
institution with a New York branch—for its role in facilitating or 
causing those terrorist attacks.168  The international legal and human 
rights community hoped that the Supreme Court decision would 
affirm that corporations were appropriate ATS defendants.169  
However, the majority framed its analysis to ascertain whether 
                                               
 163. Id. at 593–94. 
 164. Id. at 579. 
 165. Id. at 582. 
 166. Id. at 584. 
 167. Id. at 600. 
 168. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018). 
 169. See, e.g., Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Liability and the Alien Tort Statute:  
Highlights from the Oral Arguments in Jesner v. Arab Bank, CORP. SOC. RESP. & L. (Oct. 12, 
2017), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2017/10/12/jesner-v-arab-bank-highlights-
from-the-oral-arguments (addressing the concerns of several Justices about the foreign 
relations implications of the ATS); John Bellinger & Andy Wang, Jesner v. Arab Bank:  
The Supreme Court Should Not Miss the Opportunity to Clarify the “Touch and Concern” Test, 
LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:12 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/jesner-v-arab-
bank-supreme-court-should-not-miss-opportunity-clarify-touch-and-concern-test 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should clarify the touch and concern standard for 
determining whether the ATS will apply). 
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international law evinced a Sosa-level norm of holding corporations 
liable for human rights abuses and weighed whether Congress would 
be better suited to decide on a practice of corporate liability.170  
Ultimately, the majority looked to the language and purpose of the 
ATS to deny corporate liability, holding that foreign plaintiffs cannot 
sue foreign corporations under the ATS.171  Notably, the Court 
declined to expressly foreclose the ability to bring ATS claims against 
domestic corporations for foreign human rights abuses.172 
In contrast, the dissent criticized the majority for categorically 
absolving foreign corporations of responsibility under the ATS.173  The 
dissent argued that the majority incorrectly applied the first part of 
Sosa, because the majority asked whether “a specific, universal, and 
obligatory norm of corporate liability” existed while Sosa’s “norm-
specific first step” focuses on substantive norms of international law 
that prohibit certain conduct.174  Rather than whether international 
law evinced a specific and universal norm of corporate liability, the 
dissent characterized the inquiry as whether the law demonstrates any 
reason why the ATS would distinguish between a corporation and 
natural person who allegedly violated the law of nations.175  Although 
the Sosa precedent requires an international consensus about the 
violated norm, it does not require an international consensus that 
corporate liability is a norm as universal and specific as the main three 
norms identified in Sosa.176  The dissent looked to States’ collective and 
individual enforcement actions to determine that corporations are 
subject to certain international law obligations, noting that various 
                                               
 170. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407.  Concurring justices reached the same conclusion and 
found that recognizing a new cause of action would have been inappropriate because 
doing so would implicate foreign policy concerns and disrupt the balance of powers.  
Id. at 1408–10 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 171. Id. at 1407–08 (majority opinion) (naming the political branches as the bodies 
to decide whether the ATS should provide a remedy against foreign corporations, 
given that doing so could provide other countries with the equivocal right to hale U.S. 
citizens into foreign courts). 
 172. Id. at 1407 (“[T]the Court holds that foreign corporations may not be 
defendants in suits brought under the ATS.”). 
 173. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 1419–20. 
 175. Id. at 1425.  As for the first step of the ATS analysis, determining whether the 
violated norm is Sosa-specific, the dissent would remand to the Court of Appeals to 
address whether the prohibition against financing of terrorism is sufficiently specific, 
universal, and obligatory.  Id. at 1422. 
 176. Id. at 1420. 
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international agreements require State parties to hold corporations 
liable for certain conduct.177 
Plaintiff reliance on the ATS as a remedy for human rights violations 
continues.  In October 2018, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Nestlé and 
Cargill workers could sue the corporations under the ATS with 
allegations of slave labor.178  While the plaintiffs’ counsel argued that 
these claims “touch and concern” the United States because Nestlé’s 
Headquarters in the United States decided to give money and 
technological support to the foreign farmers,179 Nestlé argued that the 
claim was barred because the focus was on an injury that occurred in 
the Ivory Coast, not an alleged act of aiding and abetting that 
happened in the United States.180  Thus, the appeals judges’ ruling in 
favor of the plaintiffs demonstrates that the circuit split is likely to 
continue regarding the dual issues of whether (1) a specific tort is 
actionable under the ATS and (2) domestic corporations are 
appropriate defendants under the ATS.181 
III.    ANALYSIS 
The First Congress created the ATS as one mechanism to grant civil 
redress and fulfill the government’s obligations under the law of 
nations.182  By recognizing the law of nations as referring to 
                                               
 177. Id. at 1423–24 (cataloguing historical examples of corporate liability:  the U.S. 
Military Tribunal prosecuting corporate executives at Nuremberg; International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda finding a private radio station responsible for genocide; the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon holding that corporations may be prosecuted for contempt). 
 178. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 179. Id. at 1126; see also Anthony Myers, Nestle and Cargill Cocoa Slave Labor Lawsuit 
Takes Another Twist as Appeal Judges Rule Plaintiffs Can Sue the Companies in the US, 
CONFECTIONARY NEWS (Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.confectionerynews.com/Article/ 
2018/06/18/Nestle-and-Cargill-cocoa-slave-labor-lawsuit. 
 180. Nestle, 906 F.3d at 1125–26; see also Myers, supra note 179.  In October 2018, the 
Ninth Circuit allowed the ATS case against Nestlé to continue.  See Erik Slobe, Nestle 
Child Labor Case Allowed to Continue, JURIST (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.jurist.org 
/news/2018/10/nestle-child-labor-case-allowed-to-continue (examining how the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal). 
 181. Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1024 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (refusing jurisdiction because that plaintiffs failed to prove that a norm 
prohibiting child labor met the universality requirement of Sosa), with Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting jurisdiction 
over a claim of cruel, inhuman treatment, even though the court found no universal 
agreement on every element of the claim of crimes against humanity). 
 182. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History William R. Casto, Martin S. 
Flaherty, Stanley N. Katz, Michael Lobban, and Jenny S. Martinez in Support of Plaintiffs-
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international law,183 the ATS becomes intertwined with norms of 
customary international law and should remain true to its purpose to 
provide recourse to wronged foreign plaintiffs.184  Because corporate 
responsibility for violations of workers’ rights within supply chains is 
crystallizing into a norm of customary international law, the ATS 
provides foreign workers with a remedy to sue domestic parent 
corporations for working conditions that amount to violations of 
certain specific, universal norms.  To the extent that Supreme Court 
jurisprudence declines to find that certain other violations are 
actionable torts under the ATS, the United States fails to provide 
effective remedies to wronged workers and falls out of step with the 
international movement that increasingly finds corporations liable for 
a broader array of torts. 
A.   Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Workers’ Rights as a 
Crystallizing Customary International Law Norm 
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute lists customary law as one of four 
recognized sources of international law.185  The product of State 
practice and opinio juris, customary law is equally as binding upon 
States as a ratified treaty.186  Although still in the drafting process, the 
UN’s proposed binding treaty on business and human rights denotes 
the strength of the movement to hold corporations responsible for 
supply chain violations, under the standard that corporations should 
have foreseen the risk of workers’ rights violations.187  Current 
                                               
Appellants and Reversing the District Court’s Decision at 9–10, Doe v. Drummond Co., No. 
13-15503 (Mar. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief], 2014 WL 1870571; see also id. at 
2 (arguing that enforcing the law of nations requires sovereigns to provide redress for 
violations “when the violation occurred on the sovereign’s territory; when a sovereign’s 
subject committed the violation; and when a perpetrator used the sovereign’s territory as a 
safe harbor to avoid punishment for having committed great wrongs”). 
 183. See Abdullahi ex rel. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003)) 
(clarifying the law of nations as referring to customary international law). 
 184. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 182, at 27 (“To interpret the ATS to not 
apply to U.S. subjects would go against the well-established rule that if a country did 
not redress the wrongs of its subjects, it was an accessory to their wrongs.”). 
 185. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060. 
 186. See VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 58 (deeming customary law and treaties to be 
equivalent sources of international law). 
 187. See generally U.N. Zero-Draft to Regulate Transnational Corporations, supra 
note 40, art. 10, ¶ 6(b) (discussing the civil liability regimes State Parties should 
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international and national behaviors and trends indicate that States 
are increasingly able and willing to hold corporations responsible for 
violations of workers’ rights within supply chains.  Considering public 
acts and official statements of policy as instructive of practice that 
States follow as a matter of law, the trend of corporate responsibility 
for the violations of workers’ rights in supply chains is crystallizing into 
a norm of customary international law. 
1. International acts demonstrate a crystallizing norm of corporate 
responsibility for violations of workers’ rights 
International movements toward establishing corporate responsibility 
for the well-being of all “human components” within business 
enterprises largely fall into two practices:  guidelines that are binding or 
suggestive and legislative acts of individual States. 
The UN Guiding Principles serve as an overarching global 
framework that exhorts corporations to promote business practices 
that “mitigate adverse human rights impacts,” even if the corporations 
have not directly contributed to those harmful impacts.188  While 
international organizations have long maintained a general 
recognition of the right to “favourable conditions of work,”189 over the 
past decade alone international bodies have increased efforts to align 
ethical business practices with respect for human rights.  In 1998, the 
ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, which mandates that member States respect and promote the 
elimination of deplorable practices such as forced and child labor.190  
The ILO champions the campaign to equalize working conditions and, 
with 187 member countries who can ratify conventions, can give weight 
to growing trends based on the number of States that ratify various 
conventions.191  For example, of the ILO’s eight fundamental 
conventions, 182 States have ratified the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, 171 ratified the Minimum Age Convention, and 178 
                                               
enforce on transnational corporations for violations of human rights “to the extent it 
exhibits a sufficiently close relation with its subsidiary . . . in its supply chain”). 
 188. Implementing UNGPs, supra note 28, at 14. 
 189. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 7, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (promoting general 
practices of healthy working conditions, fair wages, and reasonable rest days). 
 190. See ILO Declaration, supra note 25. 
 191. Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www 
.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited June 1, 2019). 
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ratified the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention.192  In ratifying 
these conventions, member States affirm their commitment to abide 
by the labor standards that each convention propagates. 
Currently, the international community has placed renewed 
emphasis on improving working conditions.  Pursuant to the UN 
Global Compact, the transfer from the Millennium Development 
Goals (“MDGs”) to the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) 
represents a long-term commitment to promoting economic and 
social development within States.193  Whereas the MDGs had no 
mention of better working practices, Goal 8 of the SDGs calls for 
“immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour” and the 
protection of labor rights for all workers.194 
Increasingly, non-binding regulations and guidelines have begun to 
focus on the responsibilities of corporations in affirming the 
protection of workers’ rights and eradicating abusive practices.  Non-
binding declarations also demonstrate States’ willingness to adhere to 
a greater degree of responsibility for businesses in reference to human 
rights.  The 2014 EU Directive on Non-Financial Reporting explicitly 
called upon States to implement legislation requiring corporations to 
divulge the social and environmental impacts of their subcontracting 
chains, and by 2017, the national legislations of all EU Member States 
contained complying disclosure rules.195  OECD’s transition from the 
2011 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to the 2018 Due 
Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Business Conduct further 
depicts the renewed emphasis on corporate due diligence.  Through 
this transition, the OECD moved from encouraging business partners 
to adopt certain working principles to implementing a government-
backed due diligence standard in all economic sectors.  These new 
standards are backed by forty-eight of OECD’s member States.196 
Respective States have also enacted legislation that regulates 
corporate disclosure of possible slavery within supply chains, and the 
growing movement for corporate responsibility supports the trend of a 
                                               
 192. Ratifications by Convention, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001 (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 193. SDGs, supra note 38, at 1–2. 
 194. See generally INT’L LABOUR ORG., SDG ALLIANCE:  JOINING FORCES GLOBALLY TO 
END CHILD LABOUR, FORCED LABOR, MODERN SLAVERY, AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2016), 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/ 
publication/ wcms_450718.pdf (discussing target 8.7, which is part of the larger SDG Goal 8). 
 195. Implementation of EU Directive, supra note 46. 
 196. See New OECD Instrument, supra note 34. 
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crystallizing customary norm.  The landmark UK MSA was the first in a 
relatively quick series of State-specific implementation of legislation.197  
Within three years of the UK MSA’s introduction, France passed its own 
vigilance law.198  With slight variations, each law introduced compliance 
and disclosure plans that require corporations, which qualify based on 
threshold gross receipts or employee numbers, to disclose their steps to 
eradicate human slavery within their operations.199  Germany announced 
its CSR Directive Implementation Act to mandate that corporations disclose 
information about workers’ rights and provide an option for parent 
companies to include individual disclosures within a main group report on 
nonfinancial issues.200  The nonfinancial information must contain details on 
workers’ issues, respect for human rights, and environmental impacts.201 
These concrete legislative acts are joined by budding proposals from 
other States.  Joining its European counterparts, the Dutch Parliament’s 
proposed Child Labour Due Diligence Law became yet another example 
of how State governments are imposing duties on their corporations to 
ensure the safety of their supply chains.202  A continent away, the Hong 
Kong government released plans detailing the formation of its own anti-
slavery law, which would require annual publishing of actions combatting 
slavery.203  Hong Kong legislators imposed further restraints on corporate 
power and await final approval of their bill that would allow civil actions 
against defendants who benefited from business that they knew or should 
have known would involve slavery.204 
                                               
 197. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (U.K.). 
 198. Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétiés des mères 
et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on the Corporate 
Duty of Vigilance for Parent and Instructing Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 27, 2017 No. 99 (Fr.). 
 199. See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (requiring annual disclosures 
from corporations who do business in the UK and have a global annual turnover of 
more than £36m annually). 
 200. Gesetz zur Stärkung der nichtfinanziellen Berichterstattung der Unternehmen in 
ihren Lage – und Konzernlageberichten [CSR Directive Implementation Act], April 2017, 
BGBLI at 802 (GER); see also Von Steinau-Steinrück & Sura, supra note 49. 
 201. Von Steinau-Steinrück & Sara, supra note 49. 
 202. Oonk, supra note 52. 
 203. See Modern Slavery Law Proposed for Hong Kong, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Jan. 
8, 2018) [hereinafter Hong Kong Proposed Law], https://www.herbertsmith 
freehills.com/latest-thinking/modern-slavery-law-proposed-for-hong-kong (requiring 
corporations conducting business in Hong Kong to “detail the steps taken that year to 
ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place”). 
 204. Hong Kong Proposed Law, supra note 203. 
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Prevalent adherence to the soft-law205 principles and guiding 
documents propels the international acceptance of corporate 
regulation into a practice that States increasingly adhere to as a matter 
of law.  Although difficult to ascertain, opinio juris206 manifests itself 
through the deference States afford to conventions, directives, and 
respective national policies that promote workers’ rights.  For 
example, while the 178 ratifying members of the ILO Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention indicates a consensus of State practice, the 
ratification of the individual convention also represents a State’s 
conviction that it must strive to abolish forced labor as a matter of 
law.207  State endorsement of voluntary guidelines and principles 
further conveys that a State feels bound to recognize corporate liability 
for workers’ rights violations.  Forty-eight States signed on to the new 
OECD Guidelines that promote corporate due diligence among all 
economic sectors,208 and States implemented the requirements of the 
EU Directive on Non-Financial Information by transforming national 
legislation to acknowledge the well-being of workers.209  Considering 
the expansive implementation of national legislations restricting 
corporate behavior and the emphasis on, and State compliance with, 
international guidelines that promote corporate responsibility, the 
practices of the international community indicate that corporate 
responsibility for workers’ violations is a crystallizing norm of 
customary international law. 
2. U.S. domestic practice demonstrates the United States’ recognition of a 
crystallizing customary international norm to promote corporate responsibility 
Domestic regulation and disclosure efforts, bolstered by consistent 
executive statements, indicate that the United States falls in line with the 
growing international practice of holding corporations responsible for 
the well-being of workers within their supply chains.  Rather than objecting 
to the growing international norm, the United States’ behavior evinces an 
acceptance of the crystallizing customary norm of holding parent 
corporations responsible for supply chain workers’ rights violations.210  
                                               
 205. See VILLIGER, supra note 109 (describing soft law). 
 206. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
 207. Cf. VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 51 (“A vote cast in favour of a rule indicates a State’s 
legal conviction, just as large majorities may serve as one indicator of a communis opinio juris.”). 
 208. See New OECD Instrument, supra note 34. 
 209. See Implementation of EU Directive, supra note 46. 
 210. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (describing that customary 
international law is binding except upon States who are persistent objectors). 
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The totality of legislative actions, implemented within the last 
decade alone, indicate congressional willingness to impose due 
diligence, disclosure requirements, and government oversight on 
corporations to mitigate the risk of workers’ rights violations.  Focused 
solely on the federal sector, FAR imposes direct responsibilities upon 
federal contractors to ensure that their subcontractors and involved 
subsidiaries neither knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, 
partake in human trafficking.211  Federal contractors must produce and 
adhere to compliance plans if their activities involve a certain 
threshold of work abroad, and they must verify that they continue to 
conduct their own due diligence investigations into the human impact 
of their supply chains.212 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act further reaffirms the 
government’s commitment to disavow connections to potential human 
rights violations because it expressly requires corporations to disclose 
whether their products contain conflict minerals;213 such a stipulation 
requires, in part, that corporations have visibility into their supply 
chains to accurately report as to the presence of conflict minerals.  
Most comparable to international legislations’ disclosure laws, albeit 
limited to enforcement in one state, California’s Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act mandates that corporations provide consumers with 
published information on the corporations’ efforts to eradicate 
trafficking and slavery within their supply chains.214  Perhaps most 
promising is the prospect of the pending Business Supply Chain 
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act, which would impose 
national compliance guidelines like those that the California Act 
promulgates and require corporations to annually disclose efforts to 
combat supply chain abuses.215 
Efforts to restrict the flow of tainted goods into the United States 
also evince a desire to restrict the imports of foreign-sourced goods 
from corrupted supply chains.  Through the TFTEA, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection exercises the power to restrict the importation of 
goods from at-risk geographical areas or industries.216 
                                               
 211. Final FAR Rule Released, supra note 56. 
 212. Id. 
 213. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012). 
 214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1)–(b) (West 2012). 
 215. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2018, 
H.R. 7089, 115th Cong.  
 216. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, § 910, Pub. L. No. 114-
125, 130 Stat. 122, 239 (to be codified at scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
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Executive statements or initiatives can serve as another factor that 
bolsters the finding of a State practice adhered to as a matter of law.  
Three of the last four Presidents have issued Executive Orders that 
pertain to recognizing the necessity of workers’ rights while at the same 
time abating the risk of associating with tainted goods or corrupt 
practices.  In 1999, President Clinton’s Executive Order 13,126, 
“Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or 
Indentured Child Labor,”217 intended to prevent federal agencies from 
obtaining foreign goods produced by forced or child labor.  In 2012, 
President Obama introduced Executive Order 13,627, “Strengthening 
Protections against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts,”218 
which prohibited federal contractors and their employees from 
engaging in human trafficking activities.  Most recently, President 
Trump continued the presidential disavowal of inhumane business 
activities with his Executive Order 13,818, “Blocking the Property of 
Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuses or Corruption,”219 
which strengthened enforcement of the Global Magnitsky Act220 and 
authorized the President to issue sanctions against global offenders of 
human rights.221  Secretary of State Rex Tillerson even remarked that 
the sanctions regime indicated that the government would continue to 
pursue consequences for those who violate human rights.222  By 
consistently aiming to prohibit involvement with goods or services tied 
to workers’ rights violations within supply chains, the Executive Branch 
has conveyed an awareness that the international community disfavors 
associations that are connected to at-risk business enterprises. 
The second element of customary international law, opinio juris, is 
“the conviction of a State that it is following a certain practice as a 
matter of law and that, were it to depart from the practice, some form 
                                               
 217. Exec. Order No. 13,126, 3 C.F.R. § 195 (2000). 
 218. Exec. Order No. 13,627, 3 C.F.R. § 309 (2013). 
 219. Exec. Order No. 13,818, 3 C.F.R. § 399 (2018) (“The United States seeks to 
impose tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human 
rights abuse or engage in corruption . . . .”). 
 220. See Kerry Contini & Eunkyung Kim Sum, US Government Implements the Global 
Magnitsky Act and Publishes Magnitsky Act Sanctions Regulations and Related Designations, 
GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Dec. 29, 2017), https://globalcompliancenews.com/us-
magnitsky-act-20171229. 
 221. See Press Statement from Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State, supra note 69 
(expressing that the sanctions demonstrate the United States will continue to pursue 
consequences for those who commit serious human rights violations). 
 222. See id. 
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of sanction would, or ought to, fall on it.”223  Thus, U.S. attentiveness 
in controlling the imports of tainted goods through the TFTEA may 
provide one indicia of acting under the sense of a broader legal 
obligation.  Executive invocation of the Global Magnitsky Act and 
Executive Orders—consistent over three presidencies—can also 
demonstrate desire to refrain from associating with sectors or 
countries that have a risk of forced labor, which can lend support to 
the possibility that the government follows such a practice under the 
conviction that it might otherwise be subject to sanctions.  Legislatively, 
the government has imposed strict guidelines upon its contractors and 
suppliers through the FAR requirements, and FAR expressly provides 
for a mode of corporate liability for violations of workers’ rights that 
occur within the contracting chains.  Although opinio juris is often less 
distinct than State practice, the consistency with which the United 
States affirms the importance of clean supply chains while distancing 
itself from at-risk industries and regimes demonstrate its subjective 
understanding that protecting workers’ rights is a crystallizing 
customary international norm. 
B. The Prohibition Against Workers’ Rights Violations as an ATS-
Actionable Universal Norm 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, actionable ATS torts 
must rise to the level of a violation of an international norm that is specific, 
well-defined, and universal.224  Violations of workers’ rights can rise to the 
level of Sosa standards when the violations are of a particularly egregious 
nature, such as forced labor.  To the extent that lesser violations may be 
actionable torts, such violations would likely be precluded pursuant to the 
Sosa standard, but preclusion would be inconsistent with international 
momentum to uphold equitable working conditions. 
1. The limited scope of the current ATS framework under Sosa 
Sosa jurisprudence requires that actionable torts under the ATS are 
specific, universal, and well-defined.225  Pursuant to those stipulations, 
violations of the prohibitions against forced labor would provide 
plaintiffs with actionable torts under ATS jurisprudence. 
                                               
 223. VILLIGER, supra note 109, at 48. 
 224. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004). 
 225. Id. at 715. 
1970 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1933 
 
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit established that torture amounted to 
a Sosa norm because of the universal renunciation of torture.226  As 
evidence of this norm, the Second Circuit examined international 
treaties and accords, such as the ICCPR and European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and 
looked to modern national laws that banned torture.227  The Second 
Circuit later deemed in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. that nonconsensual 
medical experimentation violated international law and amounted to 
the universal and specific nature of an actionable Sosa norm,228 after 
once again looking to international treatment and the domestic 
history of medical consent.229   
Following the Second Circuit’s analytical approach—considering 
historical evolution of and adherence to a standard—the prohibition 
against forced labor fulfills the Sosa criteria of being universal, specific, 
and well-defined.  Internationally, under the ILO’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, member States have 
pledged to promote the elimination of forced labor and child labor.230  
The ILO defines forced labor as “all work or service which is extracted 
from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which said 
person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily.”231  The ILO has 
187 member countries, which transitively implies that 187 countries 
                                               
 226. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 227. See id. at 884 (finding that over fifty-five national constitutions expressly or 
implicitly renounced torture and relying on the State Department reporting a general 
recognition of a principle against torture). 
 228. Abdullahi ex rel. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“The prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings 
meets this standard because . . . it is specific, focused and accepted by nations around 
the world without significant exception.”). 
 229. See id. at 180–82 (comparing the progression of the ICCPR Directive prohibiting 
nonconsensual medical experimentation and the subsequent adoption of the CHRB by 34 
Council of Europe members, with Congress’s mandate and FDA regulations regarding 
patient-subject consent).  
 230. To note, the Conventions for the Abolition of Forced Labour and Child 
Labour are the only two of the eight fundamental conventions that the United States 
has ratified.  See Ratifications for United States, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo 
.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871 
(last visited June 1, 2019). 
 231. What is Forced Labour, Modern Slavery, and Human Trafficking, INT’L LABOUR 
ORG., https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en (last 
visited June 1, 2019). 
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acknowledge the ILO’s characterization of forced labor.  The ILO’s 
fundamental conventions also include the abolition of forced labor.232 
Goal 8 of the UN Development Programme specifically promotes 
“tak[ing] immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced 
labour . . . and secur[ing] the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labour,” with the provision to end child labour by 
2025.233  The ILO’s Forced Labour Convention has 178 ratifying 
countries,234 175 countries have ratified the Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention,235 and 182 countries have ratified the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention.236 
Within the domestic sphere, the U.S. government has fought, and 
continues to fight, the presence of forced labor within trade.  The 
Tariff Act of 1930237 defines “forced labor” as “all work or service which 
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its 
nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself 
voluntarily” and prohibits the importation of goods produced by 
convict or indentured labor.238  Pursuant to the TFTEA, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection has the authority and duty to prevent the 
importation of goods possibly associated with forced labor.239 
Although certain U.S. courts have already recognized slave labor as 
a sufficiently defined norm that falls within the Sosa parameters,240 
                                               
 232. Abolition of Forced Labor, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/global 
/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recomm 
endations/lang--en (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 233. SDGs, supra note 38 (aiming to achieve productive employment and decent work 
for all women and men by 2030); see also 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, U.N., 
2015, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 
 234. C029—Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.29), INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P113
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the United States, China, Republic of Korea, and Afghanistan). 
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 236. Ratifications of C182—Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), 
INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB: 
11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327 (last visited June 1, 2019). 
 237. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
 238. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012). 
 239. See Reade & Witten, supra note 63. 
 240. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also Myers, supra note 179 
(noting that the Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs to sue Nestlé and Cargill under the 
ATS for allegations of slave labor). 
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modern developments further exemplify just how appropriate and 
suitable the ATS is for claims of forced labor. 
2. Why workers should have the right to bring ATS actions for “lesser” violations 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights serve as an 
example of a collective body of rights that are essential yet whose 
violations would likely fail the Sosa test to become actionable torts under 
the ATS.241  The narrow Sosa standard prevents U.S. courts from hearing 
ripe claims and precludes important violations from gaining jurisdiction.  
For example, the United States has ratified the ILO convention against 
the worst forms of child labor.242  However, under current Sosa 
restrictions, U.S. courts would potentially lack the jurisdictional grant to 
hear any claims based on violations of the prohibition against child labor.  
For instance, in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,243 Liberian employees 
and children attempted to bring a case against a corporate employer, but 
the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to provide concrete 
evidence of customs and practices of States to show that States feel 
themselves to be under a legal obligation to impose liability on employers 
of child labor.244  The court declined to find a universal, cohesive 
perspective on child labor because of the diversity of economic conditions 
around the world and found it difficult to glean a defined rule from 
plaintiff’s three relied-upon conventions:  UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, ILO Minimum Age Convention, and ILO’s Convention 182:  
The Worst Forms of Child Labor.245 
Additionally, international courts have granted jurisdiction over 
claims alleging corporate liability for violations of health and safety 
conditions, violations which would likely fail under the Sosa test.  A 
German court allowed the continuation of a claim against a German 
company, KiK, for a fire in a subsidiary-owned factory in Pakistan that 
                                               
 241. See Implementing UNGPs, supra note 28, at 1; see also Skinner, supra note 92, at 
182 (citing the three pillars of the Guiding Principles, the second and third of which 
emphasize businesses’ obligations to comply with all applicable laws and respect 
human rights and the obligations of countries and businesses to provide victims with 
access to effective remedies). 
 242. Ratifications for the United States, supra note 230. 
 243. 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 244. Id. at 1023. 
 245. Id. at 1024.  But see Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that child labor violates a norm that is specific, universal, and well-defined); 
Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (permitting an 
ATS case to proceed when the plaintiffs presented a claim of child labor). 
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occurred due to the factory’s lack of safety measures.246  Similarly, a 
British court upheld jurisdiction for a case involving asbestos within a 
corporation’s subsidiary company.247  Both aforementioned cases 
would likely fail to meet the first threshold for ATS jurisdiction because 
the alleged torts—violations of safe and healthy working conditions—are 
not sufficiently specific to compare to the magnitude of the 1789 law of 
nations norms of safe conducts, ambassador rights, and piracy.  However, 
the international community is championing a world that recognizes a 
sustainable economy with decent working conditions, and fair working 
conditions are arguably rising to, if not already at, the status of an 
international norm.  The 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 
evinces such a desire, as the introduction of the declaration calls for the 
creation of conditions that promote shared prosperity and inclusive 
economic growth for all,248 and Goal 8.8 of the Sustainable Development 
Goals calls for safe working environments for all workers.249 
Furthermore, the actions of various corporations and multinational 
organizations indicates that they believe that safe working conditions 
are a basic right worth protecting.  Corporations are proactively 
adapting their codes of conduct to mirror this trend,250 and public 
opinion continues to advocate for greater corporate diligence in 
ensuring safe working conditions.  The federal courts’ continued 
adherence to the Sosa standard, however, likely forecloses the 
possibility of a foreign worker attaining redress from a parent 
corporation for a workplace tort, therefore leaving the injured workers 
without an effective remedy and arguably defeating the promising 
                                               
 246. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (examining the KiK case as an 
example of signaling that courts can hold transnational corporations responsible for 
workers’ violations stemming from subsidiaries’ working conditions). 
 247. See Green, supra note 99, at 459 n.51 (referring to Chandler v. Cape PLC, 
[2011] EWCA (Civ) 525, wherein an asbestos-exposed worker was able to recover from 
the subsidiary’s parent company). 
 248. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 37, at 3 (“We resolve also to create conditions for 
sustainable, inclusive and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work 
for all, taking into account different levels of national development and capacities.”). 
 249. See id. at 20 (“Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working 
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 250. See, e.g., SAFEWAY, SUPPLIER SUSTAINABILITY GUIDELINES AND EXPECTATIONS 2 (2015), 
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purpose of the ATS.251  In doing so, the United States has fallen out of 
step with the international movement to hold corporations accountable 
for the safety of workers within their supply chains. 
C.   Parent Corporation Liability for Extraterritorial Human Rights Abuses 
within Global Supply Chains 
The Supreme Court majority decision in Jesner significantly 
restricted the ability of foreigners to bring claims against corporate 
defendants because the majority held that foreign corporations are not 
appropriate defendants under the ATS.252  However, the majority 
refrained from conclusively specifying whether domestic corporations 
remain suitable defendants.  Accordingly, corporate civil liability 
allows for foreign workers to bring claims against parent corporations 
under the ATS.  Suits against domestic parent corporations do not 
implicate the Kiobel concerns of extraterritorial application because 
traditional theories of tort liability connect the parent corporation to 
the foreign acts of its subsidiaries. 
1. Piercing the corporate veil with foreseeable risk 
Practices such as limited liability have historically shrouded 
corporations from suit; however, international players are increasingly 
relying on the law to directly impose duties or responsibilities on 
corporations and “pierce the corporate veil.”  Notably, TNCs have 
acquired direct duties under some multilateral conventions that impose 
liability on corporations.253  The UN Open-Ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group is working on a proposed Treaty on Business and 
Human Rights, and Article 10(1) of the current “zero draft” explicitly 
identifies that legal persons may be held civilly liable for business activity-
related human rights violations.254 
                                               
 251. Cf. BREYER, supra note 12, at 134 (referring to the ATS as “a statute that helps 
to protect basic human rights”); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 (entered into force Jan. 3, 
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 252. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018). 
 253. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 81, at 946 (identifying the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment as two 
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 254. See U.N. Zero-Draft to Regulate Transnational Corporations, supra note 40, art. 
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persons may be held criminally, civil or administratively liable for violations of human 
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Persuasively, international judicial systems have pierced the 
corporate veil to find that parent corporations were liable for the 
actions or omissions of their foreign subsidiaries.  A German court 
upheld a lawsuit that foreign workers brought against KiK, a German 
company, for poor fire safety measures that contributed to a 
destructive factory fire,255 while English courts held that parent 
corporations owed a duty of care to subsidiaries’ employees in Chandler 
v. Cape PLC,256 Lubbe v. Cape PLC,257 and Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources 
PLC.258  Considering the four factors the Chandler court weighed before 
imposing a direct duty on the parent corporation for the asbestos 
conditions of its subsidiary259 and the call for transparent supply 
chains,260 U.S. corporations should be on notice of the possibility of 
                                               
rights undertaken in the context of business activities of transnational character.  Such 
liability shall be subject to effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal and non-
criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.  Liability of legal persons shall be 
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industry?  (3) Does the parent know (or ought to know) that the subsidiary’s system of 
work is unsafe in some way?  (4) Does the parent know (or ought to have foreseen) 
that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for 
the employees’ protection?  Chandler, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, ¶¶ [72]–[80]. 
 260. See, e.g., Urge Monster to Investigate Slavery Risk in its Drinks, FREEDOM UNITED, 
https://www.freedomunited.org/advocate/monster-slavery (last visited June 1, 2019) 
(encouraging Monster Beverage Corp. to investigate the minimal risk of slavery and 
human trafficking in its supply chain after Monster also scored 0/100 in a report on 
the largest food and beverage companies addressing forced labour); Clare Leschin-
Hoar, Was Your Seafood Caught with Slave Labor?  New Database Helps Retailers Combat 
Abuse, NPR (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:01 AM) (quoting Maisie Ganzler, Chief Strategy and Brand 
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workers’ rights violations within their global supply chains.  The 
Chandler court considered a key question to be:  should the parent have 
known that the subsidiary’s work system risked workers’ rights?261 
Given the current domestic and international push for regulatory 
disclosure and due diligence,262 U.S. parent corporations should 
reasonably foresee the risk of violations within their supply chains, 
such that parent corporations should be responsible for violations 
because they breached the duty of care they owed to the workers within 
their supply chains.  Corporate social responsibility is effectively 
trending and topically at the forefront of multinational organizations 
of which the United States is a member.263  Domestically, the United 
States has previously demonstrated a willingness to find corporations 
liable for human rights violations under certain conditions.264  
Legislatively, the FAR epitomizes parent liability through its flow-down 
provisions by which contractors will be responsible for commissions and 
omissions of subcontractors and agents at each tier of the supply chain.265  
Although the FAR only applies to government contractors,266 the 
willingness to find parent contractor liability for acts along the supply 
chain indicates that such a chain of liability is possible and in practice. 
Notably, U.S. corporations are stepping up and altering their 
workplace codes of conduct to comply with the international focus on 
corporate social responsibility.267  Through these voluntary commitments, 
corporations are thereby acknowledging—at least to an extent—that an 
onus is on them to manage their societal impact.  Regardless of whether 
corporations knew of workers’ rights violations within their supply chains, 
corporations should have foreseen the possibility of such a risk and 
therefore should not be able to evade responsibility. 
                                               
Officer at Bon Appétit Management Company, who stated that “[t]he reality is that no 
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2. Displacing the Kiobel presumption against extraterritoriality 
In Kiobel, the majority held that even when claims “touch and concern” 
the United States, the claims need to do so with “sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extra-territorial application.”268  The 
Kiobel court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Nigerian 
corporation because it found that all relevant conduct took place outside 
the United States and emphasized the importance of not wanting to 
create a precedent where other countries could hale U.S. citizens into 
foreign courts for alleged violations of international law.269  However, 
these judicial concerns do not carry the same weight in claims against 
domestic parent corporations. 
Significantly, allowing claims against parent corporations would not 
entail hauling foreign nationals into domestic courts because the 
concerned parent corporations would have been incorporated in the 
United States.  Additionally, jurisdiction over alleged violations of 
workers’ rights within global supply chains would not unduly interfere 
with the power of other political branches.  In Al Shimari, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld jurisdiction over an ATS claim for torture abroad and 
specifically noted that allowing further litigation would not interfere 
with U.S. foreign policy because the political branches had already 
demonstrated that the United States would not tolerate acts of 
torture.270  With specific reference to supply chains and corporate 
liability, current congressional legislation suggests that permitting 
courts to hear ATS claims against domestic corporations for acts 
abroad would not unduly interfere with foreign policy.271 
Further, connecting the parent corporation to the acts of its 
subsidiaries through modes of tort liability could displace 
presumptions against extraterritorial application.  Superior or agency 
liability theories prevent corporations from remaining free of 
responsibility for actions within their supply chains.272  Directly linking 
corporations to the failures of their subsidiaries would encourage 
vigilance in avoiding the corporate excuse of ignorance as to poor 
operational practices and instead offer victims the appropriate avenue 
                                               
 268. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013) (Alito, J., 
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1978 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1933 
 
for redress from the parent corporation.273  Given that holding 
domestic parent corporations responsible for the commissions or 
omissions of their foreign subsidiaries would neither implicate the 
Kiobel presumption against extraterritoriality nor unduly surprise the 
corporate defendants, courts should recognize domestic parent 
corporations as appropriate defendants under the ATS for workers’ 
rights violations within global supply chains. 
CONCLUSION 
The Jesner dissent emphasized that the true lingering ATS question 
must remain, “Who are today’s pirates?”274  Piracy, historically involving 
high seas conduct and ships considered stateless, fell under no specific 
national jurisdiction.275  Pirates, enemies of all mankind, could 
accordingly be prosecuted wherever found, regardless of their 
nationality or where the piratic acts occurred.276  Today, corporations 
are pirates:  corporations have global reach, yet can often act with 
relative impunity in advancing their enterprises.277  Corporations are 
arguably the most appropriate defendants under the ATS because they 
are global actors with power over individuals and, importantly, they are 
increasingly independent of government control.278  A foreign 
worker’s ability to sue a parent corporation in federal court under the 
ATS could incentivize corporations to undertake more diligent 
                                               
 273. See Brian Seth Parker, Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to Corporate 
Officers:  A Theory of Individual Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 35 
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compliance obligations.  If corporations know that the ATS remains an 
open door for foreign supply chain workers to have access to U.S. 
courts, these parent corporations could investigate and improve the 
transparency of their supply chains to tackle the risk of labor violations. 
Although the current Sosa and Kiobel-colored ATS jurisprudence 
narrowly construes definitions of actionable torts and defendants, 
under the current international corporate social responsibility 
movement U.S. courts should hold the ATS doors open for foreign 
supply chain workers.  U.S. parent corporations are, or should be, 
aware of the risk of workers’ rights violations within their supply chains, 
and many corporations have shouldered the responsibility by 
improving their workplace codes of conduct.  In finding in favor of the 
plaintiff in Filartiga, the Second Circuit reasoned that “courts must 
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved 
and exists among the nations of the world today.”279  As international 
law exists among the nations of the world today, corporations have 
greater social and legal obligations to disclose and take responsibility 
for the human impact of their global supply chains.  Accordingly, the 
ATS remains one of the most vital pathways into U.S. courts for 
wronged foreign workers. 
If U.S. courts truly have an interest in preventing the nation from “serving 
as a safe harbor for today’s pirates,”280 the courts should recognize a broader 
array of actionable torts under the ATS and allow foreign workers to bring 
suits under the ATS to hold domestic parent corporations responsible for 
workers’ rights violations within their global supply chains. 
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